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Special Feature 
Emergency Preparedness and Disability 
*Michael E. Waterstone and Michael Ashley Stein 
Historically, federal-level disaster preparedness has not 
adequately acknowledged the circumstances of persons with 
disabilities. On July 24, 2004, President Bush issued an Executive 
Order, entitled Individuals with Disabilities in Emergency 
Preparedness, unambiguously requiring that administrative agencies 
play a crucial role in supporting the safety and security of individuals 
with disabilities in situations involving disasters, including floods 
and hurricanes.' Nevertheless, the National Response Plan-issued 
by the Department of Homeland Security in December 2004 as an 
"all-discipline, all-hazards plan that establishes a single 
comprehensive framework for the management of domestic 
incidents"-nowhere mentions the disabled.2 
In July 2005, a year after the Executive Order, the Interagency 
Coordinating Council (ICC), which is comprised of senior leadership 
from 23 federal departments and agencies, issued an interagency 
report discussing the vulnerabilities and challenges facing the 54 
million Americans with disabilities in time of disaster.3 The report 
recognized that disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery planning efforts overlooked people with disabilities. 
Although it attempted the first steps of establishing a concerted 
interagency approach to deal with these complex issues, the report 
was operating in the shadow of overwhelming historic neglect. 
The Katrina and Rita Experiences 
The various federal administrative agencies charged with disaster 
preparedness-primarily, though not exclusively, the Department 
of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), and the Department of Health and Human Services-and 
the larger effort of federaVstate disaster relief coordination failed in 
their obligations to provide for the needs of persons with disabilities 
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Temporary shelters lacked 
accessible entrances and restrooms; people with disabilities were 
separated from their families, who often provide them support; and 
evacuees were displaced without assistive technologies. 4 The 
mainstream relief entities were severely challenged in finding medical 
necessities, including wheelchairs and medication; obtaining Braille 
and captioned information; and securing personal assistance services. 5 
The National Organization on Disability reported that less than 30 
percent of shelters had access to American sign language interpreters; 
80 percent lacked TTYs; 60 percent did not have televisions with 
open caption capability; and only 56 percent had areas where oral 
announcements were posted.6 
Moreover, people with disabilities had no centralized source of 
disability-related information, and relief workers had not been trained 
to assist them. 7 Worse, many shelters turned away disability 
specialists and their offered assistance. For example, disability 
organizations in Louisiana had difficulty securing permission to enter 
shelters so as to identify the needs of evacuees with disabilities, and 
to provide them with service referrals. 8 Currently, disability 
professionals in the Gulf Coast areas report an impending crisis, as 
Red Cross shelters are being closed without plans for accessible 
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housing alternatives.9 
Consider the FEMA application of a 51-year-old woman with 
a spinal injury, who we will refer to as Latasha to preserve her 
privacy. 10 On August 29, 2005, the day that Hurricane Rita struck, 
Latasha was carried to the attic in her home and remained there in her 
wheelchair until rescued on September 3. She developed pressure 
sores, which became infected from contact with floodwaters during 
her rescue. After being hospitalized for almost six weeks, she broke 
her leg getting into a tub in an inaccessible bathroom. Latasha's 
shower chair replacement, estimated at $1 ,200, was refused by 
Medicare, and she needs more in catheters, bags, and wound care 
supplies than Medicare provides. The cost of replacing her accessible 
van was estimated at $19 ,000--more than her auto insurance covered. 
Latasha needs to travel to Jackson for wound care every two weeks, 
and each trip costs $1 00 in gas and expenses. 
Future Policy Planning 
Litigation under existing civil rights statutes is one way of 
improving the government's disaster preparedness for people with 
disabilities. In Brou v. FEMA," a class of persons with disabilities 
brought suit against FEMA under the Rehabilitation Act §504, 12 the 
Fair Housing Amendments Act,13 and the Stafford Act,14 seeking 
injunctive relief requiring FEMA to provide accessible trailers on a 
timely basis to evacuees with disabilities, and to develop information 
systems sufficient to enable FEMA to consistently identify evacuees 
with disabilities and their need for accommodations. While this case 
is still at an early stage and no significant motions have been decided, 
the relief plaintiffs request could improve FEMA's performance in 
future disasters. In addition to these statutes, Title II oftheAmericans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA)15 applies to state and local government 
programs, services, and activities, including disaster recovery 
programs. 16 Making local government emergency preparedness and 
response programs accessible to people with disabilities is required 
by the ADA. 17 
Although the importance of litigation cannot be disregarded, 
disaster preparedness ultimately demands a better integrated and 
implemented policy approach throughout the federal government. 
Among the lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is that 
the needs of the disabled population must be both recognized and 
integrated into future federal policy planning. The disability 
community has an important role to play in impacting new and more 
proactive policy measures. Policymakers can only properly target 
priorities and develop appropriate responses if they first acknowledge 
the life experience and concerns of persons with disabilities. 
There are signs from within the federal government that expertise 
on issues impacting the disability community will gain a stronger 
foothold in disaster planning. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
President Bush ordered the Department of Homeland Security to 
conduct a review, in cooperation with local counterparts, of emergency 
plans in every major city. In a September 23, 2005 memo, Secretary 
Michael Chertoff ordered that this review include rigorous 
examination of plans for persons with disabilities. The ICC has 
issued preliminary statements on lessons learned trom Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita and disaster preparedness, 18 with the formal report 
set to be issued in July 2006. In addition, Senator Harkin has 
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proposed Senate Bill2124 ("Emergency Preparedness and Response 
for Individuals with Disabilities"). 19 Amongst other things, the law 
would create a disability coordinator within the Department of 
Homeland Security who would act as a focal point for the federal 
government's disability disaster preparedness policies and be 
responsible for turning the ICC's findings into reality. 
Finally, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released a new 
technical assistance document entitled, "An ADA Guide for Local 
Governments, Making Community Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Programs Accessible to People with Disabilities." In this 
Guide, the DOJ sets forth "action steps" in five areas: planning, 
notification, evacuation, sheltering, and returning home. These steps 
include soliciting and incorporating input from people with different 
types of disabilities; ensuring that evacuation plans enable the 
disabled to safely evacuate or be evacuated by others; ensuring that 
temporary shelters are accessible; developing site-specific 
instructions for shelter staff and volunteers to address disability-
related concerns; ensuring that persons who use service animals are 
not separated from them when sheltering; making certain that a 
reasonable number of shelters have back-up generators for life-saving 
medical devices and a way to keep medications such as insulin 
refrigerated; providing accessible communication for individuals who 
are deaf, hard of hearing, blind, and visually impaired; and identifying 
temporary accessible housing that can be used if persons with 
disabilities cannot immediately return home. 
*Michael E. Waterstone is an Associate Professor at Loyola Law 
School. Michael Ashley Stein is a Visiting Professor at Harvard 
Law School, and a Professor at William & Mary School of Law. 
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